Michael Burawoy revisits the forgotten world of state socialism by reflecting on his experiences as an industrial worker in Hungary
in the twilight of the Soviet Union (1991) , and in its market aftermath (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) .
From the standpoint of the shopfloor, he examines the peculiarities of socialist production and how it shaped working-class consciousness, leaving workers unprepared for the catastrophe that befell them during the capitalist transition. More broadly, he grapples with the limitations of his extended case method and with the challenges state socialism posed for Marxism.
His remonstrations were enjoined by Robert Merton, who reproached me for the false imputation that mistakes capitalism for industrialism. He was criticising an essay I had written in 1982 about the industrial sociology of his recently deceased student Alvin Gouldner. I claimed that Gouldner's classic text, Patterns of Industrial Bureaucracy, missed the specifically capitalist character of industrial bureaucracy. His mock bureaucracy and his punishmentcentered bureaucracy were both shaped by the exigencies of wage labour and the competitive pursuit of profit, while his representative bureaucracy was simply unrealisable in capitalism. Merton responded by saying that I had not demonstrated my claims, which would require comparisons of industrial bureaucracy both within and between capitalist and non-capitalist societies (Goulder, 1954; Burawoy, 1982) .
To atone for my sins of false comparison and false imputation, I resolved to take actually existing socialism far more seriously. I decided against the easy road of Western Marxism that dismissed the Soviet Union and its satellites as a form of statism or state capitalism, unrelated to the socialist project. Instead, I began a twenty-year journey into the hidden abode of actually existing socialism, the last ten years of which were unexpectedly devoted to following the painful Soviet transition to capitalism. Ironically, in evaluating this Soviet leap into capitalism -the experiments of shock therapy and big bang -I now turned the tables on the avatars of market freedoms. I accused them of false comparisons as they damned the realities of socialism with an idealisation of capitalism, and of false imputations as they assumed that the pathologies of Soviet societies would evaporate if its socialist character were destroyed. They forgot the transition costs, all the higher in a global order dominated by capitalism, as well as capitalism's very own pathologies. The economists thought they were shopping in a supermarket and could just grab whatever combination of institutions they wanted, then walk out without even paying. Indeed, the Russian transition proved to be looting on a grand scale. Having been under the heel of state socialism, the population at large colluded in this unrestrained expropriation to their own detriment. To be sure, they never saw themselves as being in a supermarket but in a prison. They had been there all their lives, so they assumed that life on the outside could only be better. It turned out to be another sort of prison.
The life-and-death costs of a capitalist transition, guided and justified by such false comparisons and false imputations, were no less horrific than those born of similar errors during the period of agriculture's collectivisation and the planned economy. Just as Stalinism eclipsed its atrocities by proclaiming the new order the realisation of 'communism' and by imputing perversions to pernicious capitalist legacies, so the neoliberal economists hid the horrors of the capitalist transition behind the labels of the 'free market' while imputing perversions to the obdurate inheritance of communism or totalitarianism. Behind the social science errors of false comparison and false imputation there lies a mountain of political (ir)responsibility and guilt.
In this essay, I reflect on my own attempts to grapple with the challenges of comparison and imputation in a journey that, in the 1980s, took me from workplace to workplace in Hungary, and then in the 1990s, from workplace to community in Russia's market restoration. What was peculiar, I asked, to work organisation and working-class consciousness in the 'workers' state' -that is, under actually existing socialism; and with what consequences for the demise of the old order and the genesis of the new? And now I must also ask, what are the lasting lessons we can draw from socialism-as-it-was?
How does an ethnographer compare capitalism and socialism without falling into the traps of false comparisons and false imputations? The old-style anthropologist, alone in his village and focused on the here and now, cut off from the world beyond, has little to offer. No better is the old-style symbolic interactionist or ethnomethodologist, working with the minutiae of face-to-face social interaction, searching for formal theory in social process, suspending both time and space and suppressing the historical contexts of capitalism and socialism.
Breaking out of these traditional genres of ethnography and seeking to grasp social meaning in the age of globalisation is the appealing idea of multi-sited ethnography -ethnography that connects different sites across national boundaries. Multi-sited ethnography sets out from a rejection of classical anthropology's spatial incarceration of the native, immobilised within and confined to a single place (Appadurai, 1988) , and it rejects the enforced coincidence of space, place and culture (Gupta & Ferguson, 1992) . Today borderlands, migration, cultural differences within communities and the postcolonial condition all point to ties and identities that have to be explored across and among multiple locales. In one of the field's early programmatic statements, George Marcus regarded multi-sited ethnography as the way to get inside the process of globalisation, rather than seeing it as an
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The multi-case method external system imposing itself on the life-world (Marcus, 1995) . He catalogues the techniques of multi-sited ethnography as techniques of tracing the movement of people, such as in immigration; the flow of things, as seen in commodity chains or cultural artifacts; the manifestations of metaphor, such as in Emily Martin's notion of flexibility; or the unraveling of story, as in the pursuit of social memory or the trajectory of life histories across boundaries.
Multi-sited ethnography works well in following flows, associations and linkages across national boundaries, but it is still marked by a reaction to conventional anthropology. Just as the village or the tribe used to be a 'natural' entity, so now the 'site', albeit connected to other sites, speaks for itself as a natural essence that reveals itself through investigation. Abandoning the idea of a preexisting 'site', we turn from sites to cases; that is, from natural empirical objects to theoretically constructed objects. We have to be self-conscious about the theory we bring to the site that turns it into a case of something -in this instance, a capitalist or socialist factory. What is a factory? What is a capitalist factory? What is a socialist factory? These are not innocent questions whose answers emerge spontaneously from the data: they come packaged in theoretical frameworks.
Constituting distinct sites as cases of something leads us to thematise their difference rather than their connection, which then poses questions of how that difference is produced and reproduced -in other words, how capitalist and socialist factories are different from each other, and then how that difference is produced and reproduced. Instead of the connection of sites to examine networks or flows, we have the comparison of cases constituted with a view to understanding and explaining their difference. Instead of multisited ethnography, we have multi-case ethnography. In short, the 'case' is doubly constituted: realistically by the social forces within which it is embedded and the social processes it expresses, and imaginatively by the position we hold in the field and the theoretical framework we bring to bear. Only then, when we have constituted the case, can we think about connections.
Accordingly, we begin with factories in specific places: a factory in the USA and one in Hungary; but then the factories have to be constituted as cases, expressive of the worlds in which they are situated -the worlds of capitalism and socialism. The factories have to be rooted in their broader political and economic contexts, in the systems of which they are a product. This is the first step: to see the micro processes as an expression of macro structures. The second step is to recognise the dynamics of change within each order. Capitalism and socialism are not static orders but dynamic societies, and in comparing the two, we have to pay attention to how they change over time -and not only over time, but over space too. We have to recognise both the changes that take place within factories and the variety of factories that can be found within each system -complexities expressive of the character of each order. Just as there is not a singular capitalist factory, so there is not a singular socialist factory. Thus each case dissolves into multiple subcases from which we reconstruct what they have in common, and what makes them part of a capitalist or socialist order.
So much for the realist dimension of comparison -the real forces and social processes at work that constitute the case. But there is also a constructivist dimension to comparison. Any complex site looks different seen from different places within it. A factory, whether capitalist or socialist, looks very different according to whether we take the standpoint of the manager or the worker, just as a village looks different seen through the eyes of Dalits or Brahmins respectively. As ethnographers, we don't have access to some Archimedean standpoint: we are always inserted somewhere in the site, which has grave consequences for what we see. Moreover, once inserted into a specific location, the competences of the ethnographer play a crucial role in dictating the way she or he is viewed and, in turn, views others. Some attributes are learned and others are ascribed, while the specific context, race, gender and age all affect the way others see one and interact with one. I call this first constructivist dimension positionality. In making comparisons between factories, it is important to recognise the embodiment and biography of the ethnographer as well as his or her location. Positionality, as we shall see, is very important in the constitution of the case.
The second constructivist moment refers to the theoretical suppositions and frameworks necessary to make sense of our sites. All three moments -context, process and positionality -are heavily saturated with theory. The very categories of context, capitalism and socialism, presume a theoretical framework of some sort. The dynamics of such systems -that is, social processes -cannot be examined empirically without an understanding of possible internal variation, and this requires prior conceptualisation. Even coming to comprehend the significance of position is not simply an empirical problem, since significance is also theory-ladensignificance for what? Indeed, we might say that theory is necessary to keep us steady within the field, giving us bearings on our positionality. To put it more generally and bluntly, the world is complex: we cannot see anything without lenses that make it possible to focus. We carry around lenses that are so much part of us that we don't notice we have them, yet as social scientists our task is to bring those lenses to consciousness, compare one with another, and to develop from them other, more detachable lenses that we call social theory so that we can get on with the business of studying the world. Theory is an inescapable moment in the discovery and constitution of the difference between capitalism and socialism.
It is impossible to concentrate on all four moments of comparative ethnography at the same time, so that it is necessary to proceed moment by moment, but in such a way that each step responds to anomalies created by the previous steps. The cases do not spring ready-made, as a phoenix springs from the ashes, but develop through successive approximation. The Hungarian case studies, which try to grapple with the peculiarities of socialist working-class consciousness and work organisation, are based on synchronic comparison with capitalism. I move from context to process, and from process to positionality, and finally to theory. The Russian case studies are a diachronic analysis of the transition to capitalism, proceeding in the opposite direction: from process to context and from there to theory and finally to positionality. In both sets of studies, the realist analysis precedes the constructivist analysis, but each moment always presupposes the necessary existence of the other three moments. The two sets of studies diverge in the order in which the moments are problematised, but each enters serially into dialogue with the others as, indeed, do the two series themselves.
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Capital & Class 98 The ethnographer is not a lone figure, observing the natives in isolation and recording their every move in his private notebook. The ethnographer is in dialogue not only with the participants, but also with various informants and collaborators, active participants in the process of construction and reconstruction. Here, I am drawing on the plot of Paul Rabinow's Reflections on Fieldwork in Morocco, which traces the anthropologist's dialogue with a succession of informants as he moved from periphery to the centre, moving from superficial to deeper truths (Rabinow, 1977) . In contrast to Rabinow, however, I make no presumption of increasing depth as the ethnographer engages with collaborator or adversary, nor is there the separation of the dialogic process between informant and observer from the scientific process, which is a second dialogue between theory and data -the dialogue within the academic community. They work together: the two dialogues are themselves in dialogue. From beginning to end, dialogue is of the essence in this reflexive approach to ethnography.
I had already turned my attention to the Soviet Union and its satellites in Eastern Europe when Poland was struck by the Solidarity movement (12 August 1980 to 13 December 1981). This, or so it appeared to me, was the first society-wide revolutionary workingclass movement. Why should it take place in a 'communist' society rather than in a 'capitalist' society? I watched with amazement as the movement unfolded, sweeping more and more of Polish society into its orbit, refusing to succumb to the party state as other such movements before it had done -East Germany in 1953 , Hungary in 1956 , Czechoslovakia in 1968 . I had recently completed Manufacturing Consent (1979 , which had sought to demonstrate that the Marxist anticipation of working-class revolution under capitalism was stymied not at the level of superstructures -education, ideology, state, etc. -but in the workplace; that is, in the very place where it was supposed to congeal.
My South Chicago ethnography, based on eleven months' working at a manufacturing plant of the multinational corporation Allied from 1974 Allied from -1975 , drew out a model of advanced capitalism in which 'hegemony was born in the factory' (Gramsci) and consent was produced by the very way in which work was organised and regulated. Work was constituted as an absorbing game that eclipsed the conditions of its existence. The internal labour market and grievance machinery constituted workers as individuals ready to play games, while the internal state coordinated the interests of (Haraszti, 1977) . A dissident who, in 1971-1972, had been punished by the state with industrial employment, Haraszti turned this to his advantage by writing a moving and detailed account of his experiences at the Red Star Tractor Factory. But it was serendipity that found us both in similar machine shops of enterprises producing similar vehicles, using similar technology -the familiar array of mills, drills, and lathes. I was a miscellaneous machine operator, which meant I moved from one machine to another, whereas Haraszti ran two mills. We both worked on a piece-rate system that paid workers according to how much they produced. Indeed, the Hungarian version of the book was called Piece Rates. Furthermore, workers were similarly divided into operatives like ourselves who ran the machines, and auxiliary workers who facilitated production -clerks, inspectors, truck drivers, set-up men and so forth, who could be the bane of our lives.
What was extraordinary to my capitalist eye was the intensity of work under Hungary's socialism. I estimated that Haraszti was actually working, and was supposed to be working, twice as hard as my fellow operators at Allied. He had to run two mills at once, whereas that was unheard of at Allied. Now there was the puzzle: if there was one right socialist workers had won, it was the right not to work hard. Or so conventional wisdom had it. To be sure, there was the socialist competition and the Stakhanovite movement of the 1930s, but now, with full employment, workers never feared job loss and thereby commanded considerable power on the shop floor. So how come Haraszti was working so much harder than me?
My first answer to this question lies in the political economy of advanced capitalism and state socialism. I dissected Haraszti's representation of his lived experience in order to compare it to my own. He lived under the oppressive rule of the foreman, the party and the trade union as well as of petty clerical staff. He was subjected to what I called 'bureaucratic despotism'. All this was so different from the hegemonic regime at Allied, where the trade union was a guardian of the rule of law, enforced the contract and administered a grievance machinery that protected the rights of individuals. At Allied, there was an 'internal state', but it was not manifested as the arbitrary exercise of power that Haraszti faced. Rather, it was a regulated form of power that possessed a measure of legitimacy and elicited consent to the factory order. Moreover, the internal labour market gave workers with seniority the opportunity to move away from hated bosses by simply bidding on other jobs. Haraszti had no such escape hatch.
But what had Haraszti to fear? Why did he work so hard, and how was he forced to run two machines at once? In order to answer this question, one must go beyond the regulatory order of bureaucratic despotism to its material basis: the piece-rate system. The hegemonic regime under which I laboured guaranteed a minimum wage, so that if the rate for a job was impossible, we were still assured a reasonable wage. This economic security gave rise to two types of output restriction: goldbricking, when we took it easy on a difficult job because we were guaranteed a minimum wage unattainable on the basis of piece rates; and quota restriction, in which we collectively agreed to adhere to a maximum of 140 per cent output so that management would not be alerted to 'gravy' or easy jobs. At Red Star, there was no minimum wage and no security against speed-up. There was, therefore, no goldbricking, but neither was there quota restriction, because there was no rhyme or reason to the setting of piece rates and no collective enforcement of an upper ceiling to output. Rather than establishing counter-norms to protect against the intensification of work, Haraszti was defenceless against the dictatorship of the norm. Bureaucratic despotism pulverised the workforce, making wages dependent on a battle with the norm so that workers could not develop any counter-power. At Allied, on the other hand, the security offered by the minimum wage, unemployment compensation and an elaborate 'bumping' system that protected workers against lay-offs called forth a hegemonic order in which managers had to coax and bribe rather than coerce workers into the expenditure of labour. Workers were allowed to organise work as a game of 'making out', which turned life on the shopfloor from arduousness and boredom into excitement, with an operator's status and ingenuity measured by his success in meeting but not exceeding management's output targets.
In describing these regimes of production, I was also explaining their divergent politics. In the case of hegemony, workers were constituted as individual citizens with rights and obligations, and because of the existence of rewards for seniority and collective bargaining, their economic interests were coordinated with those of the enterprise. Instead of galvanising opposition, capitalism elicited the consent of its drudges. In the case of bureaucratic despotism, workers faced the arbitrary power of the state in the form of a collusive arrangement of management, trade union and party. Workers responded to repression by carving out secretive realms of autonomy and creativity that could burst forth in a rebellion against the entire political system, as it did in 1953, 1956 and 1968. State socialism, I concluded, seemed more vulnerable to working class rebellion than was advanced capitalism. The following year, Solidarity would demonstrate precisely my point, or so it seemed.
This was the first step in developing a comparison of actually existing socialism and advanced capitalism, namely a comparison of my experiences at Allied and Haraszti's experiences at Red Star, in which each factory stood for the respective type of political economy. It assumed that each society was internally homogeneous and unchanging. The next step was to explore variations of and within capitalism and state socialism in order to see whether there was any basis to the claims I had made. Perhaps these were simply two anomalous factories?
The most difficult task was to determine whether the bureaucratic despotism found at Red Star was typical of socialist Hungary, and then why Solidarity sprang to life in Poland rather than in Hungary, not to mention the Soviet Union. A second, easier task was to examine whether the hegemonic regime was representative of the USA, and whether US production politics was distinctive among advanced capitalist countries. A third task was to pose the question of despotism: how did the bureaucratic despotism of Red Star compare with the market despotism of early capitalism? This is where I began.
The conceptualisation of hegemonic regimes under advanced capitalism and of bureaucratic despotism under state socialism both implied a contrast with the market despotism of early capitalism. 4 The hegemonic regime was built on a double supposition: first, that the reproduction of labour power (wages, social security, etc.) was independent of the expenditure of labour; and second, that the nation state set limits on the way management could wield its power by regulating a relatively autonomous 'internal state'. Comparisons among machines shops or similar work processes in Japan, Sweden, England and the USA substantiated the idea of a hegemonic regime's association with advanced capitalism, although the regulation of industrial relations and the extent of the welfare state gave rise to different types of hegemonic regimes. But what they shared as hegemonic regimes separated them from the despotic regime of early capitalism. Here, my point of departure was Marx's characterisation of manufacturing as a form of market despotism in nineteenthcentury England, wherein the livelihood of the worker was directly dependent on the expenditure of labour in the factory, and subject to the arbitrary whim of the overseer. If the foundation of despotism in nineteenth-century England was the economic whip of the market, then the source of despotism in socialist Hungary was the bureaucratic power of the party state.
Marx provided the model of market despotism, but the reality of nineteenth-century industry was rather different, operating as it did through family patriarchy as a mode of recruitment and regulation, or through the company town that assured the binding of community to workplace, ameliorated by the skill of the craftworker who could not be replaced at will. Examining various secondary accounts of factory work, I could compare patriarchal and paternalistic regimes in the English cotton industry with the paternalism of the New England mills and the artisanal regimes of the Russian textile industry. What distinguished the prerevolutionary Russian case of despotism was the greater regulatory presence of the state at the site of production, which created a clear object of struggle. Just as workers could identify the state as exploiter and oppressor at Red Star, so the same was true in the factories of St. Petersburg and Moscow. Both repressive orders were, therefore, vulnerable to insurrectionary struggles by workers.
Bureaucratic despotism might be vulnerable to the collective organisation of the workers it dominates, but why did the actual mobilisation take place in Poland rather than in Hungary? After all, Hungary, not Poland, had been the scene of the most dramatic worker uprising in 1956. Perhaps Red Star -or Haraszti's portrait of Red Star -was not a typical Hungarian factory. But how to find out? Just as I knew that in the USA, hegemonic regimes of the monopoly sector coexisted with more despotic regimes of the competitive sector, I asked, what was the corresponding variation within a state socialist economy? The most obvious counterpart to the monopoly and competitive sectors of advanced capitalism was the position of different enterprises with regard to central planning: the existence of key enterprises that received closer attention and more resources than the more marginal ones. Heavy industry had traditionally been given priority, whereas consumer goods were underprivileged. Yet there was no evidence to suggest whether or how this impacted work organisation and its regulation. The few Hungarian studies that were available, by Héthy and Mako, documented a centre and a periphery within the enterprise, with workers in the core having a more privileged existence on the shopfloor than did peripheral workers, who were subject to much greater hardship and labour intensity. This would begin to explain why Haraszti, a new and peripheral worker, was under such intense pressure to produce.
Further digging around revealed that the Red Star Tractor Factory was also under the gun of economic reform when Haraszti was working there. This monster of a factory was subject to harder budgetary constraints as attempts were made to introduce economic criteria for efficiency. The pressure from the state to tighten up its finances translated into pressure to work harder on the shop floor. Here was another reason why Haraszti might be working harder than workers in other socialist factories, as well as than workers in the USA. The enigma was beginning to unravel.
A Worker in a Worker's State was intended to be a general representation of all work under state socialism. At no point does Haraszti acknowledge that his experience might be specific to a particular factory (in crisis), to a particular time period (the beginning of reforms), to a particular country (Hungary), nor even to his particular position within the factory. Until this point, I had been trying to reconstruct the historical and locational specificity of his experience from theoretical explorations and secondary data. Still, the evidence was thin, and so I decided to examine the question by taking up a job in a Hungarian factory myself. Of course, it would be a decade later, but nonetheless worth the effort.
Fascinated by the development of the Solidarity movement, which seemed to support the conclusions of my first essay on Worker in a Worker's State, I planned an entry into Poland. By the time I had managed to secure leave of absence, however, and begun learning Polish, General Jarulzelski had staged his coup and Solidarity went underground. Instead, I readily accepted the invitation of Ivan Szelenyi to accompany him to Hungary in the summer of 1982 -his first trip back since being exiled to Australia. Coincidently, his expulsion was in part due to his role in publishing Haraszti's book. It was during those two weeks that I learned of Hungary's burgeoning sociology of labour and labour markets. I
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Positionality: American worker in a socialist factory 5 returned the following summer for six months, learning Hungarian and working first on a state farm that produced champagne and then on an agricultural cooperative in a small textile shop. During this period, I began my collaboration with János Lukács, then a young industrial sociologist at the Institute of Sociology in the Academy of Sciences.
It was the following summer (1984) that I landed a job as a machine operator at Bánki, a manufacturing plant analogous to Allied and Red Star. It wasn't easy to secure the position, since the fate of the working class was perhaps the most heavily guarded secret of state socialism. While not overly enthusiastic, the director of the enterprise was willing to go along with the idea of my working on the shop floor as long as all the authorities would endorse the project. The Academy of Sciences supported my request, and Lukács used a contact in the Central Committee to secure the support of the party. It was a tortuous process, but in the end permission was granted. I could enter the hidden abode of socialist production. I recall the look of glee on the shop superintendent's face when he was told to give me a job. He led me to an old radial drill that no one used. I soon learned why: it was not just old but dangerous. I'd never run a radial drill in my life, but for two months, that's what I tried to do.
Much of what I had inferred from Haraszti and the few industrial sociologists who had studied work was true. The party, the trade union and management were in cahoots, although they were not necessarily the oppressive presence described by Haraszti. When I tried to file a grievance with the union for non-payment of overtime, everyone laughed at me. And yes, the piece-rate system worked much as Haraszti had described it, with no security wage. The rates weren't easy, at least for me, but they were nowhere near as tight as they had been at Red Star, which reinforced my supposition that Red Star was indeed victim of the economic reforms of the immediate post-1968 period.
The most distinctive difference was our conception of social relations on the shop floor. Haraszti painted a picture of atomised individuals, and here I think he was projecting his own (unreflected) placement within the factory. As a dissident, a Jew and an intellectual, he was shunned by his fellow workers. He was thrown into competition with them, he was ruled by them, and he was most certainly not one of them. To be sure, I was not one of them either -but my strangeness had an appeal. They laughed at my inept Hungarian and at my incompetence as a machine operator, and I was embraced as an exotic foreigner. Within hours of hitting the shop floor, I was ringed by workers asking me about the USA. From my vantage point, I could see and experience the spontaneous cooperation that made production possible in the socialist factory.
Here, I drew on the work of the great Hungarian economist János Kornai and his theory of the socialist economy as a shortage economy. In an economy of centralised (re)distribution, enterprise managers continually bargain with the state for resources, as a result of which they are always in short supply. But Kornai was not one to fall into false comparisons. He understood that market economies have their own disequilibria, not in the direction of shortage but in the direction of surplus. Each economy had its own (ir)rationality -one constrained from the side of supply, the other from the side of demand. That explained a lot, for in order to be effective, socialist work organisation had to improvise in the face of the fluctuating quantity and quality of inputs on the one side, and the pressure from plan targets on the other. I saw such flexible cooperation all around me at Bánki and, curiously, its work organisation was far more efficient than that of Allied, where incomplete engines lined the aisles and where management was always demanding that 'hot jobs' -a sort of rush work -take precedence over everything else.
Indeed, I concluded that Bánki looked more like the stereotype of a capitalist workplace, while Allied exhibited features of the stereotypical socialist workplace! The reason lay in the character of a multinational capitalist corporation, which is itself a planned economy generating its own internal shortages. There was a reverse embeddedness -a corporate enterprise within a market economy in the USA, and a marketised enterprise within a corporate economy in Hungary. Just as US enterprises compensated for market exigencies with bureaucratised internal labour markets, so Hungarian enterprises experimented with market-driven inside contracting systems in order to address the exigencies of central planning.
From my vantage point in production, I was able to see more clearly the differences and similarities between advanced capitalist and state socialist production. Haraszti's account made no attempt at comparing socialist and capitalist work, but rather was aimed at the yawning gap between ideology and reality -between the workers' paradise projected by the state, and the reality experienced on the shop floor. Still, even that experience on the shop floor was coloured in ways Haraszti's biography did not reveal, his embodiment so much at odds with his fellow workers -a difference that set him apart from the working class community. Concerned to debunk state ideology, he had no interest in the peculiarity of his own experience, brought about by the economic circumstances of Red Star. My own difference, on the other hand, brought me into the community so that I could, with the help of my experiences at Allied, explore the specificity of state socialist production.
The last stage of my Hungarian odyssey took me into the heart of the working class -to the Lenin Steel Works, situated in the industrial city of Miskolc. Between 1985 and 1988, I worked there as a furnaceman on three occasions, which added up to about a year in total. The importance of shop floor autonomy in the face of a shortage economy was even more apparent here, in the production of high quality steel. Again working with Lukács, who spent time interviewing management, we observed the clash of two principles: management's bureaucratic regulation vying with workers' spontaneous collaboration. Often, we observed how senior management's interference disrupted the capacity of the shop floor to adapt to the fluctuating quality of materials and unreliable machinery. When Lukács and I reported our findings to management, a party meeting was called in which our research was vilified and we were told to do it again.
Firmly integrated into the October Revolution Socialist Brigade, I was able to focus on the class consciousness of socialist workers. Again, this was not a question of much concern to Haraszti, yet his own perspective as a dissident was not that different from those of my fellow workers. Compelled to participate in rituals that proclaimed socialism to be just, efficient and egalitarian -what I called 'painting socialism' -they were only too keenly aware of the injustices, inefficiencies and inequalities that pervaded their lives. This led them, so I argued, to embrace the idea of socialism, but as an immanent critique of the party state that governed their lives. Finally, I was approaching the question of the Polish Solidarity movement -the question that had brought me to Hungary! I worked with Konrád and Szelenyi's (1979) theory, which regarded state socialism as a system of central appropriation and redistribution of goods and services, a system in which intellectuals play a key role in defining the societal needs to be realised in the plan. Justifying open and transparent domination and exploitation, state socialism has a legitimation problem; and a system that requires legitimation is always vulnerable to being held accountable to its ideology. State socialism is vulnerable to immanent critique, demanding that the party state live up to its
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Extending theory: Western Marxist meets Eastern dissident promises. Whereas this led Haraszti to a cynical dismissal of the whole enterprise, it led workers to demand the proclaimed fruits of socialism. Through this lens, Solidarity was not an attempt to overthrow the state, but to force the state to take its own ideology seriously. It did this by keeping its distance from the state, opposing it with a burgeoning, self-regulating civil society.
But the puzzle remained: why Poland and not Hungary? Here the question was not so much one of class-in-itself becoming a class-for-itself, i.e. the capitalist question of consciousness-raising, but rather the opposite question: how class consciousness could become a material force. In Hungary, the development of a market economy to compensate for the dysfunctions of planning -the cooperatives both inside and outside production -led to a competitive individualism. In Poland, on the other hand, the lesser development of the second economy, on the one side, and the umbrella of the Catholic Church on the other, created the propensity and the resources for collective mobilisation.
As I was busy working out the conditions for a working class challenge to state socialism and the possibilities for a transition to democratic socialism, history took its revenge. Hungary's socialism did not capitulate from below but collapsed from above, and the transition was not towards some democratic socialism, but towards market capitalism. This was not met without some resistance. My own shop steward in the October Revolution Socialist Brigade was part of an effort to resurrect the council system that had sprung up in 1956, by turning the struggle over privatisation into a struggle for worker control of industry. And my collaborator, János Lukács, inspired by what he saw of employee stock ownership plans (ESOPs) in the USA, sought to introduce legislation that would favour workers' taking over their factories. But in the end this was all to no avail, as managers grabbed the profitable parts of socialist enterprises leaving the state to subsidise the rest.
I and the workers around me were completely unprepared for the transition to capitalism, precisely because we were so focused on production. The transition game was being played at the political level, slowly but surely, bringing in its train privatisation and devastating consequences for the Lenin Steel Works, as well as for many other industries. The Lenin Steel Works would slowly disintegrate over ten years to become a black dwarf, while Bánki would be completely rebuilt by its German partners. Revisiting the latter in 1999, I discovered that the old grey, noisy, oily and dirty socialist factory had been turned into a bright and polished hightech plant run by neatly clad technicians, nursing numerically controlled machines with a barely audible hum.
How could I have been so blind? As a Marxist, I came to Hungary in search of the potentialities of socialism, but now I faced the unexpected transition to capitalism. To help me uncover those potentialities, I had compared state socialism with capitalism, never thinking that one would morph into the other! To be sure, I had reconstructed Marxism to accommodate the past -a working class revolt under state socialism. I had recognised that whereas capitalism might organise the consent of workers, state socialism was far more fragile, and was as likely as not to generate dissent. In the end, however, it was the loss of faith of the party leadership in its own ideology that resulted in the crumbling of the socialist edifice and the imposition of capitalism.
While theory was indispensable for the comparative analysis, it also limited what I could see. Haraszti suffered a similar fate. He too revised his theory of state socialism in the 1980s (Haraszti, 1987) . He now saw state socialism not as a repressive order, but as a more smoothly running panopticon, absorbing rather than punishing dissent. Dissidents were no longer shot, jailed, exiled or even sent into factories. They were monitored by giving them space to make their criticisms -a far more powerful, effective mechanism of control. Like me, Haraszti did not anticipate the collapse of this order, and like me he was heavily invested in state socialism: his identity as a dissident relied on its continued existence. In the aftermath, he became no less estranged than I. Like other dissident intellectuals, he would enter politics but, as in so many cases, this was not for long. He was born to be a dissident just as I was born to be a Marxist! While all eyes were on the disintegration of state socialism in Eastern Europe, my attention turned to the Soviet Union, which, in the full flow of perestroika and glasnost, was opening itself to the sociological eye. I'd been to the Soviet Union on five occasions during the 1980s -to two conferences on US and Soviet labour history, and on three extraordinary trips with Erik Wright to launch a Soviet version of his survey of class structure. It was all too clear to me that the Soviet Union was politically inhospitable to ethnographic studies, and additionally that this was not something Soviet sociologists would ever take seriously. It simply wasn't science. I was very skeptical, therefore, when I received an invitation, while on sabbatical in Hungary in 1990, to spend ten days on the Volga River, lecturing to a boatful of industrial sociologists. Still, I accepted, having never even seen the Volga and always
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looking for new adventures, not to mention the distraction it afforded from the ongoing Hungarian debacle of the transition to capitalism. As it turned out, it was politically courageous of the organiser, Nina Andreenkova, to let me (and three other social scientists from the USA) loose among some 130 sociologists and personnel officers from a diverse array of organisations, including military plants, from all over the Soviet Union.
It was on that boat, fittingly called the Gogol, that I met Kathryn Hendley, then a political science graduate student at Berkeley, and Pavel Krotov, a sociologist from Syktyvkar, capital of the Komi Republic in the far north of European Russia. With Kathie, I would collaborate in a study of a Soviet rubber factory, known as Kauchuk, during the following winter (1991), and with Pavel I would develop a ten-year partnership, studying the capitalist transition in Komi. The theoretical framework I had developed in Hungary came up against all sorts of challenges from the civil war we discovered at Kauchuk. The study of the internal processes of social change in a Moscow factory was followed, later that spring, by a study of the timber industry in Komi, beginning with my own participant observation at a furniture factory in Syktyvkar. Here, Krotov and I looked more carefully at the character of the transformation of the economy as a whole -a move to what we called 'merchant capitalism'. In the decade that followed, I teamed up with other sociologists in Komi, most notably with Tatyana Lytkina, to examine the process of economic and social involution as it affected family life. This called for a major overhaul of theoretical framework -a shift from Marx to Polanyi. I would leave Komi with a whimper rather than a bang, as my attention was turned back on the fate of US sociology.
My introduction to working class life in Hungarian socialism came via Miklós Haraszti's brilliant account; my introduction to the Soviet landscape was more dramatic and visceral. Together with Kathie Hendley, I was plunged into an old political enterprise: Kauchuk, a rubber factory that had begun production in 1915. We arrived in January 1991, when Russia had already plunged into political turmoil. The party had formally relinquished its monopoly of political power, and the Baltic republics, inspired by the path taken in Eastern Europe, were asserting their autonomy. The struggle between Yeltsin and Gorbachev, between the Russian Federation and the Soviet Union, was intensifying. On the one side, you had the forces for privatisation and a market economy, while on
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Social process: Between perestroika and privatisation 7 the other you had apparatchiki still invested in the continuity of the planned economy. The crisis that engulfed the Soviet Union became a faultline running through Kauchuk itself.
Mode of entry always says much about the place being entered. Whether because of the changing times or because of Soviet specificities, gaining access to Kauchuk was very different than access to the Hungarian enterprises had been. In the latter case, Lukács had to enlist the support of a range of powerful authorities in the state and party, national and local, as well as in the enterprise management. Here, we gained entry through a deal struck between ourselves and the trade union leadership. If we provided computers for their kindergarten, then we could have carte blanche access to the enterprise and its personnel. So that's what we did, notwithstanding opposition from Soviet customs. And with the assertiveness of a corporate lawyer, Kathie got us access to almost everything we desired. Much to my disbelief, we even got into the morning planning meetings, where all managers assembled to discuss the state of the enterprise, the bottlenecks, the breakdowns. The dysfunctionality of the Soviet enterprise was laid out before us -until we were banned from those meetings.
From this privileged vantage point, Kauchuk looked so different from the Hungarian enterprises I had studied. First, I had finally stumbled on the true economy of shortage. Kornai insisted that, reforms or no reforms, socialist enterprises suffered from shortages, but there are shortages and shortages. They were not so palpable at Hungarian enterprises, but Kauchuk was awash with shortages, not least because of the collapsing Soviet infrastructure and its dependence on materials from all over the Soviet Union. The supplies manager was regularly vilified in the planning meetings, and it remained a mystery not only how he survived in that position, but also how he actually secured basic supplies during the winter of 1991. We finally managed to interview him, but being an astute and wily customer, he gave away no secrets of his trade.
In some ways, the external turmoil exaggerated the pathologies of the Soviet enterprise, and yet, paradoxically, at the same time it also exaggerated the opposite -the entrepreneurial moments of the Hungarian enterprise. Turbulence in the wider economy deepened the problem of shortage but, equally, created the opportunity for a complex network of cooperatives that thrived within the protective shell of the formal enterprise. The Hungarian second economy -the inside contracting cooperativeswas sedate, transparent and restrained as compared to the wild entrepreneurship we observed at Kauchuk. All the workshops contained their own cooperatives or even 'small enterprises' (as they were then called), where the real money was made. Funneling labour, machinery, materials and social contacts into their ventures, chosen managers and selected workers were able to make a killing at the expense of the official enterprise. I'd seen all this at the Lenin Steel Works, but only after 1989. At Kauchuk, we saw this spontaneous privatisation from below within the fast-eroding Soviet economy. Although, of course, we didn't know that the collapse of that entire order was just around the corner.
The internal economic transformation of Kauchuk was reflected in schisms cutting through its political superstructure. Managers could not hide from us the open warfare between the director and his henchmen on the one side, and the younger technicians and engineers on the other. The old guard, connected to the ministries, resolutely defended the Soviet planning order while the young Turks defended the encroaching market system and, which was a political reflex of the same project, the autonomy of the Russian Federation from the Soviet Union. We witnessed public meetings in which the young Turks attacked the director's private accumulation (through the cooperatives), while the director and his supporters denounced the former for sabotaging the enterprise to pursue their own careers. As the keeper of the peace, the party apparatus within the enterprise had already effectively dissolved. Nothing could contain the all-out struggle for control of the enterprise. I had seen workers use guerilla tactics on Hungarian shop floors, but this was the first time I had seen two alternative political-economic systems vying for power within a single enterprise.
This was my introduction to the Soviet economy. We were there for two months before I moved out of Moscow and trekked north to the Komi Republic, where I began a quite unexpected ten years of research into the processes and repercussions of economic decline.
I got a job at Polar Furniture in 1991 through a rather circuitous route. Pavel Krotov, whom I met on the Gogol, was the first Soviet sociologist I had come across who exhibited the ethnographic instinct. Coming from a very poor background, he knew the life of the downtrodden, and he was himself fearless in exploring it. One of his friends was a Korean entrepreneur who had recently left academia, like so many in late perestroika, to set up a small business. He, in turn, was a good friend of the young leader of the Republic's Labour Federation -part of a new generation of politicians that would come to power after the fall of the Soviet Union. It was through the offices of the official trade union that Pavel and I spent a month visiting all the main enterprises in the city. We hit it off with the personnel manager of Polar Furniture as he showed off his new, model factory that made wall units -the staple furniture found in every Soviet apartment. So we inquired whether I could work there. The old man who was the director -a known public figure -laughed and said, why not? And so I began working there, once again drilling holes, while Krotov talked with management for two critical months -May and June 1991; and then we spent another month trying to construct the linkages between the different enterprises of the Komi timber industry.
Being at the heart of the Soviet system and dependent on supplies from all over the country, Kauchuk was far more vulnerable to the turmoil in the economy. Polar Furniture, on the other hand, situated in the periphery, was able to capitalise, at least for a short time, on the disintegration of the planning system. Management formed a unified bloc, cleverly taking advantage of the new uncertainty. Spaces for manoeuvre opened up as the power of the central planning agencies evaporated. Polar had many advantages: it was well placed in the local timber consortium that organised the local industry; it depended on local supplies of timber and other materials; and it had a monopoly on the production of a needed consumer item -wall units. While shop floor life was still subject to shortages, and I experienced many moments of production standstill as well as of end-of-the-monthrush work, there was not the chaos of Kauchuk. Indeed, there was a bargain between workers and management. The various shops took responsibility for meeting the plan while management was responsible for making sure the supplies arrived, for which they had a precious commodity to barter -namely, wall units. Management could use wall units to barter for timber supplies and for lacquer or whatever materials were needed, but also for places in summer camps for the children of employees or for sugar, which was on ration.
As the political superstructure of state socialism peeled away, and as the centralised distribution system disintegrated, so enterprises were left to fend for themselves, and those that could exploited their monopoly positions in the emergent market. Time horizons shrank and no one was thinking about capital investment, but rather they were turning to a primitive, pre-bourgeois capitalism based on booty, adventure, speculation or piracy. Instead of capital accumulation, we found asset stripping. As Max Weber insisted, such a capitalism -what we called merchant capitalism -seeking profit in exchange rather than production, is a revolution away from modern bourgeois capitalism. Yes, the market was stepping in to replace the planning mechanism, but with disastrous consequences.
The collapse of the Soviet Union at the end of 1991 only consolidated the perverse effects of the market. At the beginning of 1992, prices were liberated and astronomical inflation was the immediate result, fueling barter and the invention of new currencies. Voucher privatisation, represented as a democratic way of sharing the public wealth, proved to be a peaceful and effective system of looting for the powerful. In the summer of 1992, we went up to the coal mines of Vorkuta, the site of militant strikes in 1989 and 1991, which together with miners from Siberia and the Ukraine played an important role in bringing down the curtain on the Soviet Union. There, a syndicalist fever had gripped the workers. They thought that the demolition of the party state and their taking over the mines would install a new order of plentitude. Instead, they would become the victims of mine closures as coal became more expensive with the spiraling price of transportation, and as the demand for coal fell with the collapse of the metallurgical industry. From 1991 to 1998, the Russian economy seemed to be in freefall. The only dynamic sectors involved natural resources (gas and oil) and the realm of exchange, where the mafia, banks or newfangled intermediaries were gorging on the rest of the economy. There was neither revolution nor evolution but economic involution, a gradual hollowing out of production by exchange. It was a process of primitive disaccumulation.
To underline the extent to which the transition to the market was catastrophic, I extended out even further beyond the factory, comparing the Russian and Chinese transitions. To be sure, my knowledge of China was limited, but the argument seemed compelling to me. The Russian transition to capitalism was a replica of its earlier transition to socialism -dominated by revolutionary intent. Western economists were also preaching the quickest transition possible -big bang and shock therapy -to forestall any political backlash against the market. The Bolshevik transition to capitalism argued for the most rapid destruction of all that was socialist, specifically all the levers of central control, on the assumption that the market would rise like a phoenix from the ashes of communism. But there is no market transition to a market economy without the creation of supporting institutions (financial, legal and material infrastructure). This was the lesson of China, where a market economy was incubated under the supervision of the party state. If in Russia there was transition without transformation, in China there was transformation without transition.
To study a small furniture factory in Northern Russia and draw conclusions about the transition to capitalism will appear preposterous to those who think social science proceeds through induction from fact to theory. If, however, we recognise that facts are always theory-laden, and that therefore we must begin with theory, then science progresses through the reconstruction of theory. We have to be self-conscious about the theory we carry into our studies. I began with a theory, developed in my research in Hungary and before that in the USA and Zambia through (real and imagined) dialogue with others such as Szelenyi and Kornai, of how the Soviet economic system worked. Kauchuk and then Polar Furniture became the vehicle for extending this theory to the transition to a market economy. In other words, the theory constitutes the case, and the case in turn helps to reconstruct theory.
However, the theory I worked with was manifestly Marxist, focusing on the political economy of state socialism. From Szelenyi I had elaborated the class character of state socialism, based on 'teleological redistributors' who appropriated and then redistributed surplus in a transparent fashion. These redistributors -planners, if you will -needed a justifying ideology, which in turn set in motion immanent critique. Capitalism hid its exploitative practices and secured the coordination of interests between conflicting parties. Its domination became a hegemony based on the consent of workers and intellectuals. State socialism, on the other hand, had to legitimate its central appropriation, its barefaced exploitation. It therefore always faced a potential legitimation crisis that threatened to bring down the system as a whole. State socialism was always a fragile order, which was why it had such frequent recourse to force. The success of the Hungarian system lay in the effort to build hegemony alongside and in support of legitimation.
From Kornai, I derived the distinctive character of work and its regulation. A shortage economy required a spontaneous and flexible specialisation on the shop floor that gave rise to solidarities that could fuel a working-class movement against state socialism. I was, of course, wrong. State socialism dissolved from above rather than from below. The legitimators themselves could no longer believe in their own legitimation, and they lost confidence in the capacity of the party state to deliver on its socialist promises. Like rats they fled
Working in the tracks of state socialism
Theory: From Marx to Polanyi their sinking ship for an imaginary one, dragging with them a population that was also a victim of their own hallucinations.
This revised Marxist theory could make sense of the collapse of the old order -the veritable forces of production had collided with the relations of production, a collision most forcibly felt by the political directorate. But Marxist theory had greater difficulty making sense of the genesis of the new capitalist order, especially since industrial production soon disappeared altogether. With the unleashing of market forces, what we were observing in Syktyvkar was the retreat to an economy of barter, reciprocity and household production. The strategy of research had to change dramatically. Instead of working on the shop floor with Krotov interviewing managers, I turned to the workers who were losing their jobs, trying to comprehend how they were surviving. I teamed up with a brilliant interviewer, Tatyana Lytkina, and together we visited households of those who had worked at Polar Furniture and at a local garment factory. We learned the importance of social networks of exchange, political resources that garnered benefits from the state, especially pensions, and the economic significance of subsistence production. Women became the centre of household production, and men hangers-on. Men were more likely to have lost their wage-labour jobs and were singularly ill-prepared to do anything else, whereas women held on to their jobs in the service and retail sectors, and were much better able to adapt to the exigencies of a barter economy -they inherited those skills from state socialism, and they shouldered the responsibility for children. The story is a familiar one in different parts of the world that are undergoing structural adjustment.
The market transition required a new body of theory, and for this I turned to the work of Karl Polanyi, a key figure in transition studies. The Great Transformation engaged the dangers of market fundamentalism -the view that left to themselves, markets could solve all economic problems. Polanyi argued that when certain entities -land, labour and money in particular -are fully commodified, they can no longer perform their function. Exchange values destroy use value: when commodified land can no longer support agriculture, workers can no longer contribute their labour, and money can no longer serve as a medium of exchange. Markets cannot survive if they are not embedded in social relations that regulate and sustain commodification.
If that's the general principle, the power of The Great Transformation lies in its historical treatment of market society. First, Polanyi shows the crucial role of the state in creating and then sustaining market capitalism in eighteenth-and nineteenth-century England. In short, there is no market road to a market economy.
Second, if market forces are unregulated then, precisely because they threaten the very existence of society, they generate a reaction -a reaction that takes different forms in different societies. So Polanyi claims that the counter-movement in the nineteenth century was largely the spontaneous revolt of labour -the development of trade unions, cooperatives and friendly societies, and the factory movement to limit the length of the working day. In the twentieth century, the counter-movement revolves around the nation state, reacting to global markets: social democracy in Scandinavia; the New Deal in the USA; but also fascism in Italy, Spain and Germany, and Stalinist collectivisation and planning in the Soviet Union. For Polanyi, reactions to the market can easily erode the freedoms of liberal democracy, and therein lies its danger. The Great Transformation spelled out the dangers of the liberal creed, what we now call neoliberalism. What, then, is the character of the second (or third?) great transformation?
What better foundation than The Great Transformation for exploring the consequences of the market transition in Russia? Working with Polanyi's theory I asked, what sort of countermovement to market fundamentalism did Russia exhibit? All my research pointed to the absence of a counter-movement from below: the working class had been decimated and its morale deflated. The Soviet working class was in full flight from the market, defending itself against the onrushing market tide. There was no evidence that, driven to extremes, it would spontaneously turn against the tide as Polanyi imputed to the English working class. Rather, reaction was more likely to come from above via a repressive state. Putin fit the role perfectly, personifying the authoritarian response to market fundamentalism.
In studying capitalism in the USA, Africa, Hungary or even Russia in 1991, the site of production was still at the centre of the world. It disclosed the physiognomy of the social formation in which it was embedded. Just as the market transition called forth a shift in theoretical perspective from Marx to Polanyi, from production to exchange, from exploitation to commodification, so it also called forth a fundamental repositioning in all three dimensions: location, embodiment and biography.
When plants were closing down and production was in freefall, it was not only immoral to take up someone's job, but it was also not the place from which to study the new order. The energy of the new order came from the sphere of exchange that was replacing
Positionality: Farewell to ethnography the planned distribution. In the winter of 1993, Krotov and I devoted ourselves to the investigation of banks in Syktyvkar. In the Soviet era, banks were largely accounting centres, an epiphenomenon of the planning system, but now they became a fulcrum of transition. But how to study a bank as an ethnographer? We tried for five months, and while this afforded us all sorts of insights into the dilemmas of the new companies serviced by the bank, understanding the bank itself was far more challenging.
It didn't help that I knew so little about banks, and that there was no tradition of sociology that studied banks. Once one has gained entry into a factory, it is no longer hidden: its functioning is there for all to observe, and production is tangible. Not so with a bank. This is not a productive entity but a transactional entity, and they are transactions with no firm place in space or time. We could talk to everyone in the bank, except the person who was making all the decisions, and miss everything that was crucial. Precisely because its transactions are invisible, it can be the vehicle of the wholesale movement of resources from the realm of productive to the realm of exchange, and from there into all sorts of surprising outlets. On reflection, I think we were rather fortunate not to discover much, since had we been successful we might never have lived to tell the tale. At that time, banking was a hazardous occupation as its leading cadres were the target (or source) of criminal activity. Bankers were routinely being imprisoned or shot -an indication that something important was at stake.
If location in the field was the problem we faced in the bank, it was the combination of location and embodiment that obstructed the study of survival strategies of families of the now unemployed or semi-employed workers. Short of living with them, it was almost impossible to grasp how they survived and they certainly, with the best will in the world, could not articulate their tacit, nondiscursive knowledge. Even had I lived in families, I think it would have been difficult to comprehend what they were up to. The complexity of their lives would have been inaccessible. I simply did not have the categories, the concepts or the theory with which to interpret what I heard and saw. All this was made amply clear to me when I worked with Tatyana Lytkina. I watched with awe and amazement the way she unraveled, layer by layer, the household strategies that our informants recounted. She knew when and how to probe, she knew what was justification and what was cause, what was surface and what was deep. It might take her several long interviews, but she always managed to ferret out from our informants things they did not comprehend themselves, so much part of their unexamined life. After every interview, during which I generally remained silent, she would interrogate me to see what I had understood. Hard as I might try, I invariably failed the test. It was not simply a matter of language, though my language skills were always limited and that didn't help, but the unfamiliarity of the practices embedded in the language. Our informants knew that Tanya understood their livesshe was from their class, she grew up in a rural community, and she migrated to town like so many others. She went through the same struggles as they, trying to keep her own family together. She shared with them the language of life, a very specific life that was inaccessible to me. I was fascinated by the confidence and assertiveness with which she interrogated her interviewees, and by how trusting were their responses.
Gender, of course, was central to the picture. She herself, from her own life, understood what it meant to be the main breadwinner and manager of the household. She understood what no man could. Indeed, when we tried to interview men about strategies of survival, we quickly landed in a cul-de-sac. Even under Tanya's prompting -and she was an expert interviewer with many strings to her bow -men simply did not know what was going on in their own households: they abstained from the very process, had become parasites and burdens. In their depression, they had also become inarticulate.
It was not just my gender but my nationality and, indeed, my profession that posed serious problems in the field. Not just with regard to families but also with regard to our studies of enterprises, whether they were in the timber, coal or construction industriesour interviews became more difficult over time. In the beginning, managers were full of hope for the future, happy to embrace a sociologist from the USA and proud of the possibilities of their enterprises in the newly found freedom of the market. But as they struggled to survive and as the economy plunged into depression, so the mood of the managers also changed. Rather than greeting me as a long-lost friend, they wondered what I was doing returning year after year. I often wondered myself. To be sure, fellow workers from Polar, at least those who had managed to find jobs elsewhere after its closure, were happy to greet me in their homes. But this was a decaying society in which social research became daily more difficult.
It is interesting indeed to think about my reception in different workplaces, my biography of engagement. At Allied, where the workforce was fragmented by age and by race and came from all over the South Side of Chicago, workers had little tolerance for my incompetence. My experiences there were, perhaps, more similar to Haraszti's at Red Star. When I came to Hungary, the situation was reversed and my incompetence was a source of amusement, eliciting sympathy and even affection from fellow workers. There, I would go out drinking with my brigade and visit them in their homes -the only problem being when to write my field notes. Especially at the Lenin Steel Works, the more I drank the more I had to write, the less time I had at my disposal, and the more difficult it was to concentrate. Russia, however, was more like Chicago. Here my exotic qualities redounded against me. Syktyvkar had been a 'closed' city, more or less cut off from the outside world, so my fellow workers had never seen an American before, let alone a professor labouring on their machines. I felt my every move was being watched, and I was excluded from shop floor rituals. This was also the time of Gorbachev's campaign against alcohol consumption, so it was difficult to break the ice with alcohol. Instead, a few workers took pity on me and invited me to play dominoes in breaks and in down time. As I discovered years later, that was not the only problem. The forewoman in my shop had exploited my presence, continually warning workers that they had better come to work on time because there was an American watching! Finally, there is the age factor. When I began my ethnographic odyssey in Chicago I was 27, towards the lower end of the age spectrum. There were people my age and I could stand to work for eight, ten and even twelve hours a day. Ten years later, it was already more difficult -and added to that, transactions were conducted in shop-floor Hungarian and besides, one never gets used to rotating on shifts. By the time I got onto the Russian shop floor I was 44 -not that old for a real worker, but arduous for an itinerant one like myself. Moreover, learning yet another language at that age, for someone not good at learning languages in the first place, was an uphill struggle. As it turned out, Russian industry more or less shut down so I didn't have to ever work again. For me it was a blessing, for others a catastrophe.
If post-colonial theory tries to come to terms with the illusions of independence struggles, with the involutionary processes that denied liberation to post-colony after post-colony, then postsocialist theory must settle accounts with the illusory hopes of a market transition, hopes that were borne within socialism. What was this society, and what did it portend?
In my Hungarian studies, I paid close attention to the specificity of state socialism by comparing it with advanced capitalism, trying to be attentive to the variations of each. Throughout, I was preoccupied by the capacity of capitalism to absorb any challenges to its existence, and by the way it thrived on economic crisis while state socialism was more fragile, held together by force and legitimacy rather than hegemony and consent. If capitalism effectively reproduced itself, state socialism, so I thought, harboured an alternative, democratic socialism. Undoubtedly, there were such alternatives nurtured in the womb of state socialismPolish Solidarity, the flourishing of cooperatives in Hungary, and the Russian burgeoning of civil society under perestroika. These sprang naturally from the logic of state socialism. They aimed to address one pathology or another, to fix socialism so that it could work better, to bring its reality into conformity with its ideology.
The warning against false comparisons, the admonition not to compare the reality of one society with a utopian version of another, doesn't preclude the comparing of the reality of a society with its ideological representations of itself -what we call immanent critique. State socialism was especially vulnerable to immanent critique because it did not hide exploitation and domination: it had to justify and legitimate them as being in the collective interest. Immanent critique, calling attention to the failed promises of socialism, can lead to cynicism and retreat if it is not attached to social movements inspired by alternatives struggling to free themselves from within the girders of the existent. That is what happened.
While I was seeking nascent alternatives within socialism, the ruling powers had other ideas. They decided to abandon socialism altogether. Just as the ruling groups of the post-colonial world were gripped by a project of Western modernity, the very modernity that had subjugated them in the first place, so powerful fractions of the Soviet ruling class were gripped by the utopian possibilities of capitalism. Aided and abetted by Western economists, ruling elites succumbed to a fateful false comparison: they compared what they regarded as their own miserable reality with a glittering imagination of capitalism. They did not, could not, comprehend the limits of capitalism.
Worse, they succumbed to false imputations as well as false comparisons. Just like their forefathers who led the Bolshevik Revolution, the marketeers presumed that destroying the past was sufficient to create a radically different and better future. They thought that by destroying state socialism as wantonly and as rapidly as possible, a radiant capitalism would arise miraculously from the ashes of the old. In fact, the Bolsheviks were far more realistic in their imputations than the marketeers, once it became clear that there would be no socialist revolution in the West, and that the Soviet Union would be surrounded by hostile countries. The theory guiding Lenin, Trotsky and Bukharin was far more realistic than that which guided such forgotten figures as Yeltsin, Gaidar, Burbulis and Chubais. The marketeers had far deeper illusions about their prospects not only because of the illusory qualities of their theory, but because they would be joining world capitalism rather than fighting against it. They understood neither the costs of transition, nor that they might end up with a peripheral and impoverished dictatorship rather than Swedish social democracy. Capitalism was not organic to Soviet socialism, it was imposed upon that society from above and from outside. As our Russian studies of economic involution show, the imposition led to wild and unanticipated distortions, pathologies and disasters.
There is a temptation to repress the era of state socialism as a bad dream, marked as the longest road from capitalism to capitalism. Those who take this road now turn to the investigation of the plurality of capitalisms, relegating the comparison of capitalism and socialism to the dustbin of history (Burawoy, 2001) . Post-socialist theory, on the other hand, demands that we think about what has passed, what socialism was, what were its potentialities, and what its implications for the way we think about today's world and its alternatives. Post-socialist theory speaks to the illusions of free markets and liberal democracy that enraptured so many under the heel of the Soviet dictatorship. Post-socialist theory takes a standpoint against capitalism, pointing to its limitations as an economic system, and to the way it necessarily generates inequality, marginality and oppression, absorbing and repressing dissent while organising consent. The fragility of state socialism helps us to better comprehend the strength and vitality of capitalism.
In searching for standpoints against capitalism, post-socialist theory calls forth the ethnographer as an archaeologist seeking embryonic, emergent forms within the interstices of capitalismsocial, economic and political forms that challenge capitalism. These social experiments, these emancipatory forms are real utopias or ideal types that require analytical abstraction, an interrogation of their constitutive principles, the exploration of their external conditions of existence and thus the possibilities of their dissemination, as well as an understanding of the internal contradictions that disclose their dynamics and sustainability. Postsocialist theory dispenses with eschatologies based on laws of
